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The general problem the US Air Force 
faces when procuring and managing con- 
ventional aircraft munitions is determining 
the best mix of weapons to hold in inven- 
tory. The desire to determine the best in- 
ventory 190 along with the structure of the 
problem—led the Air Force to adopt opti- 
mization over 25 years ago as a means to 
determine munitions stocks. 
However, the Air Force's experience 
has shown there is a more specific set of 
problem definitions, with the following 
three covering virtually all questions a mu- 
nitions optimization must answer: first, 
what is the effect of having or not having a 
particular weapon in the inventory 
(tradeoffs); second; what is the best way to 
allocate munitions and aircraft to targets, 
given a fixed inventory and scenario (allo- 
cations); and third, what weapons invento- 
ries do we need to meet our warfighting 
goals for a particular scenario (require- 
ments). 
Over the years the Air Force has built a 
set of models to address these problems, all 
of which require certain fundamental in- 
puts. First, the models need a scenario, 
which consists of a collection of target types 
of various quantities and some measure of 
importance or precedence for their destruc- 
tion. Second, the models require a set of 
aircraft, which fly time-varying sortie rates 
(missions per aircraft per day). Third, the 
models need data describing the effective- 
ness of each feasible aircraft-weapon com- 
bination against each target type. Given 
this information, these models try to opti- 
mize the allocation of aircraft sorties and 
weapons against targets in accordance with 
some objective function. 
The Air Force has a common approach 
to the munitions problem: use optimization 
to best allocate aircraft and weapons to tar- 
gets in a particular scenario. However, the 
objective functions and constraints of the 
existing models differ significantly. There 
is no general agreement among the models 
on what the meaning of "best" is, nor is 
there much agreement on which con- 
straints are necessary. 
Before proceeding, it will be helpful to 
discuss the dimensions of the entities in 
this class of models (Figure 1). Sorties are 
valid combinations of an aircraft, weapon, 
weapons loadout, delivery tactic (or pro- 
file), time period, weather state, target, and 
target depth (or distance band). Targets are 
classified by type, distribution across dis- 
tance bands, and target class. Weapons are 
characterized by type, component family 
(for weapons that share common parts), 
and qualification requirements (for weap- 
ons that can only be employed by a limited 
proportion of aircraft or aircrews). The ex- 
isting models use these dimensions in vary- 
ing degrees. 
THE EXISTING MODELS: HEAVY 
ATTACK, TAM, MIXMASTER, 
AND CTEM 
At this point, it is useful to provide a 
brief overview of the three existing models 
included in the consolidation (HEAVY AT- 
TACK, TAM, MIXMASTER) and another 
widely-used model in the same class 
(CTEM). Figure 2 contains a summary of 
the differences; a complete discussion and 
specific references are available in Yost 
[1995]. 
HEAVY ATTACK is the oldest of the 
models, having been in use since 1973. The 
model was originally formulated by ana- 
lysts in the Office of the Secretary of De- 
fense and was implemented by RAND 
(Clausen [1974], Brown [1994]). HEAVY 
ATTACK assigns values to each target and 
optimizes the total target value destroyed 
(TVD). The model uses a nonlinear objec- 
tive function to capture battle-damage as- 
sessment (BDA) effects and diminishing 
marginal returns, and optimizes for a single 
period; the latter is called the time-myopic 
approach. HEAVY ATTACK is the most 
aggregated of the three models, allocating 
aircraft sorties to targets without directly 
modeling weapons. Instead, HEAVY AT- 
TACK determines the best weapon for each 
combination of aircraft, target, and weather 
state and computes a composite effective- 
ness for an aircraft sortie against a target 
using an input weather distribution. 
HEAVY ATTACK also does not model air- 
craft attrition; available sorties are an input, 
and the model's allocation does not affect 
available sorties. HEAVY ATTACK does 
not contain budget constraints, and only 
has the single objective of maximizing 
TVD. The amount of aggregation in the 
model, along with the use of advanced 
nonlinear programming techniques, makes 
HEAVY ATTACK very small and very fast, 
with response times in seconds. 
The Theater Attack Model (TAM) was 
developed by the Air Force Studies and 
Analyses Agency in the mid-1980's, and at 
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SORTIE 
aircraft type (F-16) 
weapon type (GBU-24 laser-guided bomb) 
loadout (2 GBU-24's) 
delivery profile (level delivery at 10,000 ft altitude) 
time period (day 1-3) 
weather state (12,000 ft ceiling, 5 NM visibility) 
target type (aircraft shelter) 
distance band (100-150 NM from border) 
TARGET 
type (aircraft shelter) 
distance distribution (40% at 100-150 NM ) 
target class (airfield targets) 
WEAPON 
type (GBU-24) 
component family (GBU's w/ common laser seeker) 
qualification family (aircraft with laser designators) 
Figure 1.   Dimensions of the primary entities in existing munitions models. The models all use sorties, 
weapons, and targets, but with different levels of detail. This figure gives an example of each dimension. 
as a replacement for HEAVY ATTACK (Might 
[1987], Jackson [1989]). TAM is highly detailed, 
allocating sorties by aircraft, weapon, target 
type, target distance, weather state, and time 
period. In addition, TAM offers multiple objec- 
tive functions, budget constraints and attrition 
constraints. The most common TAM objective 
is maximizing TVD; as opposed to HEAVY AT- 
TACK, all TAM's objective functions are linear. 
BDA is not modeled in TAM, but available 
sorties are affected by attrition. TAM weather 
differs from HEAVY ATTACK in that TAM 
assumes the weather is known perfectly. How- 
ever, the model uses the weather distribution to 
constrain the proportion of the time each sortie 
type can be used. TAM optimizes globally 
across time, but this feature and other dimen- 
sions in the model make the resulting optimi- 
zations very large. TAM solution times for typ- 
ical scenarios and current hardware take about 
an hour. 
MIXMASTER is a collective name for an 
optimization model and an heuristic developed 
at the Air Force's HQ Air Combat Command in 
1990. The MIXMASTER linear program (LP) is 
a time-myopic version of TAM with only the 
TVD objective function, while the MIXMAS- 
TER heuristic is a greedy sortie allocation 
scheme that uses target values to determine the 
proportion of sorties dedicated to each target 
type. MIXMASTER was built as a response to 
dissatisfaction with HEAVY ATTACK, and the 
developers were directed not to use optimiza- 
tion. The LP version of MIXMASTER was writ- 
ten only as a check for the heuristic (Langbehn 
and Lindsey [1991]). The MIXMASTER heuris- 
tic is very fast, determining a solution in a few 
seconds; the LP, being a subset of TAM, runs in 
minutes. 
The Conventional Targeting Effectiveness 
Model (CTEM) was developed for HQ USAF/ 
XOOC (also known as Checkmate) in 1990 for 
analysis of current operations (Cotsworth 
[1993]). CTEM is a conventional derivative of 
the widely-used Arsenal Exchange Model 
(AEM), which has long been the standard for 
force structure analyses for nuclear weapons. 
CTEM is more of an optimization system than a 
specific model, as the user can shape the objec- 
tives and constraints in many ways. Typically, 
CTEM is used as a preemptive goal program 
where targets are grouped into target classes 
that must be attacked in a certain priority order; 
CTEM users normally do not use target values. 
In addition, CTEM has the capability to allocate 
suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), and 
jamming sorties. CTEM does have some BDA 
modeling capability, can assign multiple costs 
to aircraft and weapons, and either constrain or 
optimize any combination of these costs. CTEM 
solution times range from one to three hours, 
depending on the scenario being analyzed. 
MODEL CONSOLIDATION 
The differences among these four models 
led to serious disagreements over weapons re- 
quirements, which became harder to reconcile 
as the Air Force's procurement budgets began 
shrinking in 1990. At the same time, the Air 
Force began to take a more active role in con- 
trolling model development and proliferation, 
and became interested in reducing the number 
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HEAVY ATTACK TAM MIXMASTER CTEM 
Objective function 
linear-target value X X X 
nonlinear-target value X 
goal X 
multiple X X 
Sortie dimensions 
aircraft X X X X 
weapon X X X 
target X X X X 
loadout X X X 
time period X 
distance band X X X 
weather state X X X 
user-defined X 
Target dimensions 
type X X X X 
distance band X X X 
user-defined X 
Time approach 
myopic X X X 
global X 
Miscellaneous 
BDA X X 
weather known X X X 
weather unknown X 
budget X X 
SEAD/jamming X 
attrition affects sorties X X X 
Figure 2.    Capabilities of existing munitions models. The existing models vary widely with respect to objec- 
tives, constraints, and dimensionality. 
of models addressing similar problems. After a 
study was completed comparing the various 
models (Yost [1995]), three of the owning USAF 
agencies agreed to consolidate their optimiza- 
tions into one system, since their missions con- 
centrated on munitions tradeoffs and require- 
ments. As a result HEAVY ATTACK, TAM and 
MIXMASTER were destined to be replaced by a 
single system. The agencies felt a consolidation 
would be advantageous for all; a new develop- 
ment would advance the capabilities of this 
class of models, leverage their investment in 
common databases and data management 
tools, and provide a common framework for 
their analyses. 
CTEM, on the other hand, was built to han- 
dle the allocation problem, and it did not con- 
tain some of the capabilities necessary for re- 
quirements and tradeoff analyses. Also, 
Checkmate was in the middle of imbedding it 
in much larger operational system, and it 
would have been disruptive to try to include 
CTEM in two large-scale efforts that had con- 
siderably different aims. Therefore, the Air 
Force felt it would be better to let CTEM con- 
tinue as a separate model. However, CTEM has 
had an influence on the consolidated model, 
and the groups regularly share information on 
new and proposed methodologies. 
The Air Force formed a working group to 
manage the consolidation, and this group gave 
the USAF Office of Aerospace Studies (OAS) 
the task of combining and extending the three 
models. Consequently, OAS produced two 
variants of the same formulations. The first set 
of models, collectively called QUICK STRIKE, 
operate as a sequence of optimizations. QUICK 
STRIKE optimizes sortie allocations for a single 
period, and passes the output from that period 
to the next period's optimization. This time- 
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myopic approach keeps the model small and 
fast, but complicates global analyses and forces 
the user, rather than the model, to explicitly 
define how resources can be used across time. 
The other variants, collectively called TIME 
STRIKE, globally optimize allocations across 
time. These two names survive as submodels 
under the new name for the entire system, 
which is the Combat Forces Assessment Model 
(CFAM). 
Due to the complexity of CFAM and the 
number of inputs, this article contains only an 
abbreviated mathematical formulation. How- 
ever, the entire formulation is available in Yost 
[1996], which also covers derivations of the sub- 
models. 
CFAM: OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS AND 
TARGET CLASSES 
While CFAM is intended to be a consolida- 
tion, several features have been added that 
were not available in the existing models. Also, 
CFAM is not a single formulation; it offers user- 
selectable objective functions and constraints to 
allow the analyst to tailor the model to the issue 
at hand. 
The CFAM models contain five different 
objective functions, three of which are retained 
from the existing models to give the users a 
sense of backward compatibility. Maximizing 
TVD, the most commonly-used objective in the 
existing models, is included in CFAM; in addi- 
tion, CFAM includes two TAM objectives that 
don't use target values. The first minimizes 
aircraft attrition subject to a set of target de- 
struction goals, while the second objective min- 
imizes the cost of buying new aircraft and 
weapons subject to target destruction goals. 
However, the user community was dissat- 
isfied with the existing objective functions. The 
TVD objectives, while widely used, are difficult 
to control. In this class of models, the user 
typically has to tell the model what sort of 
campaign he wants to conduct, which generally 
means specifying sets of targets that have to be 
killed in a particular sequence, while constrain- 
ing or minimizing attrition and resource expen- 
ditures. Attempts to use various methods such 
as the analytic hierarchy process to compute 
target values based on the user's view of the 
campaign rarely worked well because the opti- 
mization, which is juggling different resource 
availabilities and usage rates, often picks solu- 
tions apparently at odds with the user's values 
(i.e., the model killed 1000 bridges of value 1 
and skipped the 10 command-and-control bun- 
kers with value 100, but got the same TVD). The 
manipulation of target values was criticized by 
Lord [1982], and was a source of discomfort 
throughout the history of these models. For 
example, in the Air Force's annual require- 
ments computations using HEAVY ATTACK, 
at least half of the analysis time was spent 
changing target values to induce the model to 
kill targets in the correct order. Users asked the 
reasonable question, why can't we just put in 
our campaign priorities? Why do we have to 
translate our aims into target values, and then 
change them constantly to get the model to do 
things in order? 
It seems the TAM objectives to minimize 
either attrition or costs subject to a set of goals 
would be the answer. The problem with these 
objectives is that they are inelastic; that is, if the 
model can't kill all the targets required, it ter- 
minates as infeasible and yields little useful 
information. Also, the TAM objectives required 
the user to specify goal achievement at a par- 
ticular time; the objectives could not minimize 
the time required to achieve a goal, which is a 
frequently-asked question. The working group 
wanted a cure for the inflexibility and a way to 
do the time minimization. 
To overcome these problems, CFAM offers 
two elastic objectives. The first, called the time- 
scripted objective, allows the user to designate 
goals for destroying targets across time. CFAM 
minimizes the sum of the penalties associated 
with not achieving the goals, which keeps the 
model feasible if the goals can't be met. The 
time-scripted objective works well in cases 
where the user is evaluating a specified sched- 
ule for a campaign. However, users often want 
to determine the time necessary to achieve cam- 
paign objectives, so CFAM's remaining objec- 
tive function is called the phase-goal objective. In 
this objective, the user divides the campaign 
into phases, which are sets of goals for each 
target class. The objective pursues the phases in 
a hierarchical order defined by the user, and 
attempts to minimize the time required to ac- 
complish the phases. This objective allows the 
user to define overlap between the phases, so a 
phase can start before all the goals in the pre- 
vious phase are met. As a result, the user can 
control each goal's degree of preemption (Fig- 
ure 3). 
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Figure 3. Phase-goal objective with thresholds. This campaign consists of 3 phases, with a .8 threshold for 
phase changes. Phases 2 and 3 can't start until Phase 1 is 80% complete, and Phase 3 can't start until Phase 2 is 
80% complete. The threshold parameters allow the user to control the degree of preemption in the campaign 
phases. 
CFAM's notion of target classes is a major 
difference from HEAVY ATTACK, TAM, and 
MIXMASTER, and supports the fact that cam- 
paign objectives involve killing collections of 
related targets rather than individual target 
types. CFAM allows a user to group a set of 
target types into a target class, set a time- or 
phase-dependent goal for their destruction, and 
rely on the model to treat them as a group. 
In the example shown in Figure 4, the sec- 
tor ops center is a member of both the airfield 
and integrated air defense system target 
classes. CFAM's phase goal objective function 
would require the user to define the proportion 
TARGET TYPES TARGET CLASSES GOALS 
Kill 50% by the end 
of time period 1 mam runways 4 /. / 
hardened aircraft 
shelters airfields 
/              r\m ou/o uy uic enu 
of time period i 
maintenance 
facilities I         °R   
sector ops center 
integrated air 
defense system 
■    Kill 80% in phase 1 
air defense radar site 
regional air defense 
HQ 
'    Kill 50% in phase 1 
Figure 4. Targets, target classes, and goals in CFAM. A target can be included in multiple classes, and each 
class can have its own time- or- phase-dependent goal. User-defined penalties determine the importance of 
achieving each goal. 
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of targets in each class that need to be killed to 
complete the phase, while the other objectives 
would require the user to set proportions by 
time period. 
In practice, the time-scripted and phase- 
goal constraints have largely replaced the use 
of target values. Users have found that the top- 
down specification of phases, goals, and target 
classes is much more natural than the bot- 
tom-up approach of using individual target 
values. If, for example, a CFAM user wants to 
first kill air defenses, and then concentrate on 
command-and-control targets, he can group 
those target types into classes, set requirements 
for how much of the target class must be killed 
in each time period or phase, specify the over- 
lap he will allow in the phases, and run the 
model. If the model can't achieve the goals, 
then the elastic objective still tells the user 
which targets or target classes are causing prob- 
lems, which is of considerable interest. In addi- 
tion, the phase-goal approach explicitly mini- 
mizes the time to complete a phase. 
Experience with CTEM (and 30 years of 
experience with its ancestor, AEM) has shown 
that a goal-orientation is much easier for users 
than a target-value orientation. Indeed, this is 
the most valuable insight that CTEM (and 
AEM) have contributed to CFAM's develop- 
ment; both CTEM and AEM allow target-value 
optimization, but users have always rejected it, 
citing its unpredictability. CFAM does not even 
allow the user to set the magnitudes of the 
weights or penalties; he can only choose the 
sign (reward or penalty) and the order (1 
through n). The objective functions use built-in 
constants based on the priority of the phase and 
the priority of the target class within the phase, 
and leave the user to specify what he wants 
done when (in the time-scripted case), or in 
what order (in the phase-goal case). These con- 
stants are model performance parameters 
rather than external values, and are generally 
set to force a reasonable degree of preemption 
without causing scaling problems in the model. 
Our approach is not unusual; for example, 
Steuer [1978] reports similar problems with a 
forest-management model, and in that model 
the analysts also chose an ordinal (priority), 
rather than a weighted (value) scheme. 
Again, the philosophy is to get the user to 
specify the desired campaign in natural terms 
(phases, time goals, target classes). Nonethe- 
less, some analysts like target values, and 
CFAM can accommodate them as well. 
SORTIE AND KILL ACCOUNTING 
CFAM unifies several ideas in the existing 
models about what can happen on each sortie 
and how kills are counted. Figure 5 shows all 
possible sortie outcomes in CFAM. The out- 
comes are straightforward. A sortie may not be 
scheduled due to an unfavorable weather fore- 
cast, an attrition limit which prohibits further 
flying, or an aircraft running out of a resource 
such as weapons. Also, the sortie is subject to a 
probability of an in-flight weather abort due to 
errors in the forecast. Expected kills and ex- 
pected attrition for sorties that strike the target 














in-flight weather abort 
expected attrition expected attrition 
Figure 5. Possible outcomes of a sortie in CFAM. The available sortie may not be scheduled due to a lack of 
weather capability, the model already having lost too many aircraft, or the lack of a resource such as weapons. 
Otherwise, the aircraft reaches the target and is subject to attrition. The model computes expected kills for the 
cases that do not abort at the target due to weather. 
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kills are adjusted for the number of aircraft that 
are killed prior to reaching the target. 
Once a target is struck, there are also sev- 
eral possible outcomes, as shown in Figure 6. 
This kill-accounting scheme captures an impor- 
tant effect—previously modeled only in 
HEAVY ATTACK—which is that a target can 
be killed, but misclassified and restruck. This 
dilution of sorties due to incorrect battle-dam- 
age assessment (BDA) is an important effect 
and must be represented in a realistic model. 
Another important effect is the ability of the 
enemy to regenerate (repair) dead targets. In 
both cases, CFAM has modified and extended 
the existing approaches, as discussed later. 
TIME MODELING 
Time periods are necessary to model arriv- 
als of aircraft and weapons in the theater, 
changes in sortie rates, shifts in campaign ob- 
jectives, and changes in attrition rates. How- 
ever, the existing models view time differently. 
Both HEAVY ATTACK and MIXMASTER are 
time-myopic, with output from each period's 
solution (with perhaps some external alter- 
ation) used as input for the next period. TAM, 
on the other hand, has an intrinsic time index in 
the formulation. 
There are disadvantages to adding time to a 
model. HEAVY ATTACK can use a nonlinear 
BDA function and still remain small and fast 
because it only optimizes in a single period; 
adding time would enormously complicate the 
model. Explicit time periods also increase the 
size of the model. HEAVY ATTACK and MIX- 
MASTER are small and quick because each pe- 
riod's optimization consists of 1,000-2,000 vari- 
ables and a few hundred constraints. On the 
other hand, TAM can grow as large as 180,000 
variables and 5,000 constraints, largely due to 
the intrinsic time index. As a result, TAM is 
usually run with only 4 periods of 3,7, 20, and 
30 days, because the LP becomes too big to 
solve otherwise. Conversely, HEAVY ATTACK 
can run 20-30 myopic time periods in very little 
time. 
In addition, there is a good argument for 
forcing myopia. The existing models conduct 
one-sided campaigns—the enemy has no 
choices. Letting an optimization look across 
time contradicts reality, particularly when the 
models assume the enemy doesn't react. This 
omniscience has been a perennial problem in 
TAM, which tends to wait for periods with low 
attrition rates to kill difficult targets unless ex- 
plicitly constrained from doing so. TAM also 
uses its knowledge of the future to kill easy 
targets with high target values early so more of 
them are repaired and then restruck (earning 
more TVD). 
Nonetheless, the myopic approach is a dis- 
advantage for the analyst trying to solve a re- 
source allocation or budgeting problem. If there 
is a fixed pool of procurement money available 
for a multi-period scenario, the analyst has to 
explicitly allocate or constrain expenditures by 
period. Since optimization is good at making 
these decisions, it seems unreasonable to force 
the analyst to guess the best time-constrained 
allocations outside of the model. 
The compromise reached in CFAM is to use 
time explicitly in the model, but to limit the 
optimization's false omniscience. In CFAM, 
time is still divided into periods of user-select- 
able lengths, but now each period consists of an 











target dead            1 target regenerates       1 target scheduled for restrike 
Figure 6. Possible outcomes of a target kill in CFAM. A kill may either have correct BDA, in which case it is 
either dead forever or regenerates, or it may have incorrect BDA and is scheduled for a restrike. Only one of the 
outcomes results in a permanent kill. 
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integral number of fixed-length planning cycles. 
A planning cycle is the number of days over 
which the campaign executes with no feedback; 
in other words, this is the assessment time lag. 
The planning cycle is key to CFAM's BDA and 
target regeneration submodels, because it rein- 
troduces myopia and some of the so-called fric- 
tion of war into the model. If it were possible to 
solve enormous models at no cost, CFAM 
would simply define the time period length as 
the planning cycle length. Unfortunately, this 
isn't possible, so the design team used the no- 
tion of a planning cycle to capture BDA and 
target regeneration effects within a period. 
The analyst must weigh time fidelity in the 
model versus responsiveness when using 
CFAM. If the analyst needs many time periods 
for goal changes and aircraft arrivals, he can do 
so at the cost of generating a much bigger 
model. If his goals are coarser over time and he 
needs quicker turnaround, he can use fewer 
time periods and generate a smaller, faster 
model. In either case, the addition of the plan- 
ning cycle cures problems with BDA and target 
regeneration within a period, as we'll discuss in 
the next section. 
BATTLE-DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 
AND TARGET REGENERATION 
BDA has been a problem for the existing 
models, with HEAVY ATTACK being the only 
model that accounts for restriking dead targets 
due to bad BDA. In HEAVY ATTACK, the 
probability of restriking a dead target is a func- 
tion of the number of targets already killed and 
a parameter known as the "C-factor," which 
varies between 0 and 1. A C-factor of 0 implies 
perfect BDA, while a C-factor of 1 implies no 
BDA and random targeting. There are two 
problems with this approach. First, the C-factor 
has no physical meaning. C-factors are not 
probabilities, but are merely adjustment factors 
that determine the marginal returns of contin- 
ually attacking a particular set of targets (Lord 
[1982], Boger and Washburn [1985]). As a re- 
sult, the analyst has to set the C-factors based 
on their effects on the model output rather than 
by using any available data. 
Second, HEAVY ATTACK presumes that 
success in killing additional targets of a partic- 
ular type is a function of the number of those 
types of targets already killed. For a collection 
of tanks on a battlefield in a short time interval, 
HEAVY ATTACK'S BDA scheme is a good 
model. The more tanks that are killed, the more 
difficult it is for an attacker to discriminate 
among live and dead tanks. On the other hand, 
this is not a good model for fixed targets such 
as bridges. For these targets, the probability of 
a bad assessment has nothing to do with the 
number of similar facilities that have been 
bombed. 
The BDA problem is an open research is- 
sue. In the meantime, CFAM's current BDA 
model is a compromise that keeps the model 
linear, explicitly defines the BDA factors, and 
denies the optimization's tendency to defeat 
BDA effects through omniscience. First, CFAM 
uses a single BDA input for each target type, 
which is a static probability of misclassifying a 
dead target as still being alive. Second, CFAM 
does not allow credit for any more kills against 
that target type until each misclassified target is 
restruck, as shown in Figure 7. In this example, 
Tl contains 2 planning cycles. CFAM assumes 
kills occur uniformly across a time period, so 
half of the misclassified targets happen in the 
first planning cycle of Tl and must be restruck 
in Tl, while the other half must be restruck in 
T2. On the other hand, T2 contains 4 planning 
cycles, so 3/4 of the targets struck in the period 
that have incorrect BDA must be restruck 
within T2. 
This mechanism allows us to capture the 
BDA effects and the lag effects in long time 
periods. If the model could wait until the next 
period to restrike targets, it would tend to wait 
until the last period to accumulate kills and 
avoid the workload caused by bad BDA. This 
can't happen in CFAM, as kills against these 
targets are discounted and the model prohibits 
additional kills against other targets until the 
bad BDA workload is accomplished. Con- 
versely, the planning cycle lag forces some sem- 
blance of reality by making the model wait to 
recognize the need to do restrikes. 
Target regeneration also uses the planning 
cycle. CFAM lags the detection of regenerated 
targets by one planning cycle, using the same 
logic as it uses for incorrect BDA. Again, the 
assumption of the planning cycle is that the 
sortie allocation is fixed over the length of the 
cycle, and the model cannot act on new infor- 
mation until the next cycle. Therefore, a newly- 
regenerated target must wait one cycle before it 
can be retargeted. 
A serious limitation of the existing models 
is that they do not allow target regeneration 
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 A START T2 START T3 MIS-BDA'D TGTS 
KILLED HERE ARE 
RESTRUCK IN T2 
MIS-BDA'D TGTS 
KILLED HERE ARE 
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Figure 7. Time periods, planning cycles, and BDA in CFAM. Period Tl contains 2 planning cycles. Incorrect 
BDA from targets struck in the first planning cycle of Tl forces restrikes in the second planning cycle of Tl, while 
incorrect BDA in the second planning cycle of Tl forces restrikes in period T2. This approach allows for both 
a lag time to recognize bad BDA and the ability to schedule restrikes within a time period. 
within a period, which is a problem for targets 
with short repair times in long time periods; in 
addition, they do not allow control of the num- 
ber of targets regenerated. CFAM allows mul- 
tiple regenerations and retargeting within a 
time period, up to the number of planning cy- 
cles. Since the objective functions only count 
the target's status at the end of a time period, 
CFAM must allocate additional sorties to keep 
a target dead or in repair. CFAM can also con- 
trol the total number of targets regenerated by 
using an input repair proportion to determine 
the expected number of targets repaired after 
every planning cycle. The user can also adjust 
this parameter to implicitly constrain total re- 
pair capacity. 
Target regeneration and BDA are imple- 
mented in one submodel, which is derived in 
Yost [1996]. 
WEATHER EFFECTS 
The existing models describe weather in 
terms of "weather states", which are mutually 
exhaustive combinations of ceiling and visibil- 
ity. Historically, the munitions-analysis com- 
munity has partitioned the distribution of 
weather into 6 states and has used the propor- 
tion of the time the weather is in each state as a 
static input. These states affect the model be- 
cause each aircraft-weapon combination has a 
number of delivery profiles associated with it, 
and each profile is valid only in certain weather 
states. For example, a medium-altitude profile 
might only be possible in the best three weather 
states, while a low-altitude profile using radar 
bombing might be possible in any weather 
state. 
TAM and MIXMASTER assume perfect 
weather knowledge. There is no sense of a fore- 
cast, and these models assume the weather 
states occur in their fixed proportions in each 
period. On the other hand, HEAVY ATTACK 
models weather through its weapon-aggrega- 
tion scheme. This procedure is equivalent to 
assuming that the weather is unknown when 
aircraft are allocated to targets, but known 
when weapons and delivery profiles are se- 
lected. 
Unfortunately, neither assumption is true. 
Campaign planners don't have perfect weather 
knowledge, but they can forecast with some 
degree of accuracy. This issue has become more 
important as we develop autonomous (and ex- 
pensive) weapons that have guidance systems 
unaffected by weather, because we need to cor- 
rectly measure the payoff from having such 
weather-resistant weapons. CFAM does not of- 
fer a complete solution to the weather problem, 
but takes a step further than existing models by 
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forcing sorties to be scheduled in accordance 
with the distribution of forecast weather rather 
than the distribution of observed weather. More 
importantly, CFAM dilutes scheduled sorties 
by using the probability of forecast error to 
determine the number of in-flight weather 
aborts. 
As an example, consider the following data 
provided by the Air Force Environmental Tech- 
nical Applications Center in Figure 8. 
A delivery profile that is valid in any par- 
ticular weather state (WX) is valid in any higher 
state. Therefore, CFAM selects delivery profiles 
based on the forecast using cumulative con- 
straints. In this example, 2% of the targets are 
forecast to have weather WX 1, so 2% of the 
scheduled profiles must be capable in WX 1. 
Since the 5% of the targets forecast for weather 
in WX 2 could also be hit with WX 1-capable 
profiles, 7% of the scheduled deliveries must be 
capable in WX 1 or WX 2. The CFAM weather 
constraints work in this cumulative fashion for 
all weather states. Note that if an aircraft type is 
only capable in WX 6, then CFAM would as- 
sume 19.4% of the available sorties for that 
aircraft type are lost in the period; these sorties 
are unscheduled and are not subject to attrition. 
To account for forecast error, CFAM uses 
the conditional probability the weather is in- 
valid for the profile, given a forecast of valid 
weather for the profile. This probability deter- 
mines the proportion of sorties that aren't 
aborted in-flight due to weather; data for this 
example is shown in Figure 9. Suppose the 
model uses a profile whose minimum weather 
state is WX 3. Given the forecast was for WX 3 
or better, there is a .8596 probability the 
weather will be WX 3 or better. When the 
model schedules WX 3 deliveries based on a 
forecast, 85.96% of them reach the target and 
14.04% abort. An important assumption is that 
an aircraft that suffers a weather abort is still 
subject to attrition; in other words, the aircraft 
goes all the way to the target before discovering 
it can't deliver the weapons. 
The CFAM weather model is conservative 
in that, in reality, aircraft can often be rerouted 
in flight to a secondary target based on weather 
information provided by earlier attacks. While 
we could model this as some sort of proportion, 
we have elected to keep the model conservative 
since there is so many other "fog of war" issues 
that we do not handle. Also, CFAM does not 
degrade attrition rates in bad weather, which 
would be the case for optical- and infared- 
guided air defenses which can't see the at- 
tacker. The latter problem may be addressed in 
a future upgrade, which will expand the attri- 
tion submodel; for now, we have again chosen 
to be conservative. 
INPUT FILTERS AND OPERATIONAL 
LIMITS 
CFAM uses a number of factors outside of 
the formulation to limit the number of alternate 
sortie types. This is necessary because the num- 
ber of possible combinations is very large. A 
typical scenario may contain 9 aircraft types, 90 
target types, 300 delivery profiles, and 60 
weapon types; in addition, aircraft may carry 
smaller loadouts of the same weapon to extend 
their range. When combined with multiple time 
periods, these combinations can easily lead to 
an LP containing several hundred thousand 
variables. 














Figure 8. Marginal forecast probabilities by weather state. Higher numbers indicate more favorable weather. 
For example, WX 1 represents a ceiling of 0 feet and 0 NM visibility, while WX 6 represents a ceiling of 12000 
feet and a 5 NM visibility. 
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Figure 9.   Non-abort proportions by weather state. These are the proportion of the time the weather is in a 
particular state or better, given the forecast was for a particular state or better. 
The first step in CFAM preprocessing is to 
remove dominated profiles from the database. 
These are delivery profiles for a particular air- 
craft-weapon-target combination that have a 
lower effectiveness and a higher attrition than 
another available profile that can be used in 
that weather state. This simple screen removes 
up to 30% of the possible aircraft-weapon-pro- 
file combinations. The second step involves re- 
moving operationally infeasible combinations 
of aircraft, weapons, and targets from the data- 
base. This is done externally, and the amount of 
reduction depends on how many cases the user 
is willing to rule out. 
Next, the preprocessor filters the inputs 
based on two user-supplied settings: the mini- 
mum expected kills per sortie (EKS); and the 
maximum attrition per sortie. Attrition and 
EKS limits are present in various forms in the 
existing models' preprocessors, but their use is 
emphasized in CFAM. An aircraft-weapon-de- 
livery profile combination that has a probabil- 
ity of .001 of killing a target and a probability of 
attrition of .25 is unlikely to be chosen in the 
optimization, and would never be chosen in 
reality. Therefore, users should be aggressive 
with these filters and throw out as many excess 
variables as possible prior to running the LP. 
Computational experience with TAM shows 
that LP's in this class only choose a few hun- 
dred deliveries out of several hundred thou- 
sand, so it makes sense to remove the inefficient 
alternatives before presenting them to the model. 
The final screen is based on an operational 
constraint that is not treated in the existing mod- 
els: the rninimum operating altitude in the pe- 
riod, commonly known as the hard deck. Hard 
decks are real and crucial operating constraints in 
modern air warfare. If the theater commander 
decides to fight a medium-altitude war such as 
DESERT STORM, a great number of delivery tac- 
tics are simply not available. In addition, weap- 
ons effectiveness, particularly for visual deliver- 
ies, varies greatly with release altitude. 
Figure 10 shows a typical reduction due to 
applying these filters. Reductions of an order of 
magnitude in the number of sortie cases are not 
uncommon. 
TWO-THEATER MODELING 
Currently, the US national military strategy 
requires   support   of   two   near-simultaneous 
NUMBER OF CASES 
INITIAL DATABASE 
after excluding DOMINATED PROFILES 
after excluding OPERATIONALLY INFEASIBLE CASES 





Figure 10. Input filtering for CFAM. Applying filters for dominated profiles, operational infeasibility, effec- 
tiveness, attrition, and hard deck settings can remove over 90% of the possible sortie combinations prior to 
running the model. Using the filters can drastically reduce the size of the LP. 
Military Operations Research, V2 N4 1996 Page 63 
CONSOLIDATING THE USAF'S CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS MODELS 
"major regional conflicts" (MRC's). Unfortu- 
nately, none of the existing models allow for 
two theaters. As a result, CFAM allows for 
two-theater campaigns, so the analyst can de- 
velop requirements for both theaters simulta- 
neously. The first campaign starts in the first 
time period, and the second campaign can start 
in any time period. The analyst can divide the 
budgets among the theaters or use additional 
constraints to bound the overall resource con- 
sumption in both theaters. 
Another important capability in CFAM is 
the ability to swing, or redeploy, aircraft from 
the first campaign to the second. Force reduc- 
tions have led the USAF to adopt a swing doc- 
trine for certain high-value, high-leverage as- 
sets such as the F-117. However, the question of 
when to swing these aircraft and how many to 
swing is an open issue. CFAM can optimize the 
timing and number of swing aircraft, given 
user-supplied bounds on the number that can 
swing and when they can swing. 
All the machinery available in one cam- 
paign in CFAM is implemented in the two- 
theater formulation. The theaters have separate 
target sets, separate weather distributions, BDA 
rates, regeneration rates, sortie rates, force 
structures, and so on. This capability does not 
come without cost; a two-theater LP can be- 
come very cumbersome, making intelligent use 
of the filters very important. 
BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 
HEAVY ATTACK and MIXMASTER do 
not contain budget constraints. The most com- 
mon version of TAM has one budget constraint, 
which is applied globally. Aircraft and weap- 
ons in TAM have marginal costs, and the model 
can either purchase assets subject to a spending 
constraint or minimize the amount spent to 
achieve certain goals. However, the TAM bud- 
get scheme has two shortcomings. First, the 
single budget isn't flexible enough to account 
for different types of resources consumed by 
weapons and aircraft, such as procurement 
funds, airlift, and airfield space. Second, it 
doesn't distinguish expenditures on aircraft, 
which are long-term assets, and munitions, 
which are expendables. 
To address these problems, CFAM contains 
four different budgets in two categories, and 
the analyst can use any or all of them as con- 
straints. The categories are called carry and no- 
carry to denote how the resource can be spent 
across time. A carry budget represents a re- 
source such as procurement funds; it has no 
relation to time within the model, because the 
goal is to determine the investment necessary 
to meet campaign goals in a future conflict. 
Conversely, a no-carry budget represents a re- 
source that must be used within a time period; 
unused resources don't "carry" to succeeding 
periods. This budget models resources such as 
airlift, which must be spent when available and 
can't be saved. There are two carry and two 
no-carry budgets available in CFAM. 
One limitation of CFAM is that assets can 
only be bought in one budget; purchased assets 
do not consume a vector of resources, as shown 
in Figure 11. For example, buying a weapon 
cannot simultaneously consume procurement 
dollars and mobility resources; the assets are 
only available in each budget, and each budget 
must have its own upper bounds on aircraft 
and weapon purchases. This may seem to be an 
unreasonable assumption, but design team 
chose to implement budgets this way to avoid 
unnecessarily complicating the formulation to 
address a set of problems that have yet to come 
up in practice. 
AIRCRAFT ATTRITION 
CFAM uses an approach similar to TAM's 
for modeling aircraft attrition. Each feasible 
combination of aircraft, weapon, target, and de- 
livery profile suffers an input proportion of 
attrition based on the time period; however, 
targets killed by the model do not affect these 
attrition rates. Changes in attrition rates due to 
enemy air-to-air or surface-to-air assets as a 
function of time are determined externally to 
the model. CFAM uses these inputs to constrain 
or minimize attrition, depending on how the 
user is running the model. 
However, the user has the option in CFAM 
to specify how attrition affects sortie genera- 
tion. In TAM, attrition reduces the number of 
available sorties. CFAM offers this option (see 
the formulation), but also offers the option of 
turning off the sortie reduction. The first case is 
the same as assuming no replacement aircraft 
are available. In the second case, the user as- 
sumes all losses are replaced within the time 
period and the remaining aircraft can tempo- 
rarily fly more sorties to account for the missing 
aircraft prior to its replacement; as a result, no 
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Figure 11. CFAM budgets. Each budget type has its own pool of aircraft and weapons. The carry budgets 
represent resources that can be spent across time and theater (MRC), while the no-carry budgets represent 
resources that can only be spent when and where they are available. 
sorties are lost due to attrition. However, 




The CFAM models are straightforward lin- 
ear or mixed-integer programs that do not re- 
quire special solution techniques. Therefore, 
the Air Force has chosen to use GAMS (Brooke, 
Kendrick, and Meeraus [1992]) to generate the 
models. The system can use any commercial LP 
solver that interfaces with GAMS, and input 
and output are managed by a graphical user 
interface written in Visual BASIC. While the 
interface is hosted on the PC, the actual model 
can be run on either a PC or a workstation-class 
system (Figure 12). 
TIME STRIKE'S performance depends on 
the size of the data set, the objective function 
used, and the amount of filtering. Current 
1-MRC scenarios consider approximately 9 air- 
craft types, 60 weapons types, 70 target types 
distributed in 4 distance bands, 7 time periods, 
6 weather states, 10 target classes, and 3 phase 
goals. These problems result in formulations 
containing approximately 20,000 variables and 
7,000 constraints; however, subsequent filtering 
after one or two tuning runs reduces the LPs to 
roughly 7,000 variables and 2,000 constraints 
for time-scripted goals, and 8,000 variables and 
3,000 constraints for phase goals. Experience 
has shown it is better to run TIME STRIKE a 
few times with a small number of time periods 
to identify clearly unproductive sortie combi- 
nations and test the feasibility of the campaign 
goals. Subsequent runs with filtering go consid- 
erably faster, and some of the solvers allow us 
to save previous solutions and do a "warm 
start" for runs with minor changes. Solution 
times on current PC's range from 2 to 11 min- 
utes, depending on the choice of LP solver. 
GAMS overhead in generating the model is 
modest, ranging from 1 to 3 minutes. A sepa- 
rate column-generation utility is available for 
TIME STRIKE to allow the user to consider all 
combinations without filtering. 
QUICK STRIKE is much less sensitive to 
problem size, because it solves as a sequence of 
optimizations. The scenario discussed above 
would generate an LP with approximately 2500 
variables and 1000 constraints for each time 
period, and these problems will solve in less 
than one minute each. However, the user must 
allocate resource across time manually, so it is 
better to use TIME STRIKE and QUICK STRIKE 
together. TIME STRIKE can give advice to 
QUICK STRIKE on how to allocate resources 
such as budgets and attrition across time, while 
QUICK STRIKE can help determine how to set 
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Figure 12.   CFAM structure. This diagram shows the fundamental parts of the CFAM system, along with the 
commercial software used. 
the time periods in TIME STRIKE. For example, 
a TIME STRIKE run with 4 12-day time periods 
may show that 60% of a budget should be spent 
in the first 12 days, while the rest should be 
saved for the last three periods. QUICK STRIKE 
can then be constrained to leave 40% of the 
budget for the last 36 days of the campaign; 
otherwise, due to its myopia, it may choose to 
spend its budget too soon and cripple capabil- 
ity in later periods. Conversely, QUICK 
STRIKE, running 3-day periods may show that 
phase changes occur only in days 4-6 and 19- 
21, enabling the user to reduce the number of 
time periods in TIME STRIKE to 3 (1-3, 4-18, 
and 19-48), cutting down on the size and run 
time of the model. 
GUI DEVELOPMENT AND DATA 
AVAILABILITY 
The reader may have noted that a tremen- 
dous amount of data has to be supplied to 
CFAM, and nearly all of this data is tightly 
coupled. In the past, users relied on an ad-hoc 
combination of databases, spreadsheets, and 
utilities to manage and preprocess this data, 
and analysts frequently found themselves do- 
ing two weeks' worth of database preparation 
to support two days' worth of analysis. As a 
result, the Air Force has put a substantial in- 
vestment into the development of a graphical 
user interface (GUI) to handle input, execution, 
and output. The GUI, written in Visual BASIC, 
will centrally manage all input and output, and 
for the first time the fundamental input data 
will be stored in databases rather than flat files 
of varying formats. While GUI development is 
not of primary interest to the readers of this 
journal, it is important to note the GUI should 
deliver nearly as much improvement in pro- 
ductivity as CFAM itself. 
If CFAM had been built with no predeces- 
sors, it is doubtful the Air Force could have 
generated the data for this model. As it turns 
out, CFAM benefits from 25 years' of experi- 
ence with HEAVY ATTACK, TAM, and MIX- 
MASTER, because entire data systems and 
management relationships already exist to sup- 
port those models. For example, the attrition 
database is the full-time occupation of an entire 
group of analysts at Eglin AFB, and involves 
running a complicated suite of simulations to 
develop attrition information for each mix of 
aircraft, target, profile, and scenario. Weapons 
effects data is similarly complicated to gener- 
ate, but CFAM can rely on the services' contin- 
ued investment in the Joint Technical Coordi- 
nating Committee's Air-to-Surface group for 
development of standard methodology and 
software to build kill probabilities for various 
weapons. Conversely, the BDA methodology is 
deliberately simple because data currently does 
not exist to support a more complex submodel. 
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FUTURE EFFORTS AND COMMENTS 
ON THE CONSOLIDATION 
CFAM development continues. A sub- 
model for the air-to-air part of the campaign is 
being tested, and research is in progress on a 
formulation that allows the model to allocate 
SEAD (suppression of enemy air defenses) as- 
sets. There is also a variation of the CFAM 
formulation that allocates sensors to targets, so 
the model must first find a target before attack- 
ing it and then allocate another sensor look to 
perform BDA. This will unify the detection and 
BDA submodels and allow us to directly assess 
the value of sensors. The final (and most ambi- 
tious) research effort is to use game-theoretic 
concepts to extend CFAM to a two-sided 
model. 
However, the model as described here has 
been used for several munitions studies al- 
ready, and it will replace HEAVY ATTACK in 
1997 as the Air Force's standard for determin- 
ing weapons requirements. CFAM is managed 
by the Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency, 
and a user's group that coordinates distribu- 
tion, documentation, and modifications is in 
place. 
This effort was easy in one sense because it 
was based on existing models, but considerably 
more difficult in another because it was a con- 
solidation. Many of the users of the existing 
models had spent years mastering and improv- 
ing their particular system, and they were re- 
luctant to give up methods that were provably 
poor in theory but demonstrably effective in 
practice. Also, the entire group had to con- 
stantly battle the tendency to throw great num- 
bers of marginally useful extensions into the 
system. A good example of this was our debate 
over budgets. Of the existing models, only 
TAM had a single budget, while the other two 
had no budget capabilities at all. In spite of this, 
several users felt the four budgets installed in 
CFAM were insufficient. Much of this desire for 
new capabilities was a result of pent-up de- 
mand, as none of the models had been signifi- 
cantly extended in many years. 
Although the Air Force has succeeded in 
this case in eliminating a set of partially dupli- 
cative models, there is something to be said for 
having competing approaches available. The 
reader may have noted that none of the existing 
models was all good or all bad; each had its 
advantages and drawbacks. Many of us in- 
volved in the development of CFAM have won- 
dered whether our consolidation may cut off 
some of the natural competition that had 
evolved among these models. However, the 
corporate viewpoint is that the common invest- 
ment will overcome this monopolistic behavior; 
in the past, no one organization had the fund- 
ing or manpower to make sweeping upgrades 
in their model, but they can collectively make 
continual improvements in CFAM. 
Optimization is a valuable and appropriate 
tool for the munitions problem. Optimization 
can consider a large number of force mixes far 
faster than a simulation-oriented approach, and 
models such as CFAM can make a huge num- 
ber allocation and budget decisions in a single 
run. This, along with the sensitivity analysis 
available in linear programming, has made 
these tools invaluable to the Air Force for the 
last 25 years. This should be true for the next 25 
years as well. 
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FORMULATION: INDICIES 
The following formulation is for a single 
period with the time-scripted objective in a sin- 
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gle theater. As a result, there is no time index or 
theater index as is present in the full CFAM 
model, nor is there a discussion of the other 
objective functions. The full formulation, in- 
cluding derivations, is available in Yost [1996]. 





p delivery profile 
w weather state 
d distance band 
c target class 
f weapon component family 
q weapons qualification family 
b budget 
We also use the following to denote valid 
n-tuples (correspondences) of the index argu- 
ments. For example, cc(k,c) denotes the set of 
all admissible target-target class combinations. 
cc(k,c)       target-target class 
correspondence 
fc(j,f)       weapon-component family 
correspondence 
qc(j,q)       weapon-qualification family 
correspondence 
r(i,j,l,d)       aircraft-weapon-loadout- 
distance band correspondence 








budget b resource 
consumed per aircraft i 
maximum number of 
aircraft i available for 
purchase in budget b 
expected losses per 
sortie for combination 
i,j,k,p 
objective function 
weight for attrition 
expected number of 
targets k dead or in 
repair at the end of the 
time period; adjusts for 



















resource limit for 
budget b 
objective function 
weight for spending in 
budget b 
number of weapon j 
scheduled to arrive 
this period 
expected kills per 
sortie for aircraft i, 
weapon j, target k, 
loadout 1, profile p 
maximum number of 
common components 
available for weapon 
family f 
proportion of targets in 
target class c to be 
killed to achieve the 
current goal 
cumulative proportion 
of forecasts for weather 
states 1 through w 
inventory of weapon j 
on-hand 
number of weapons 
carried per sortie for 
loadout 1 
maximum losses of 
aircraft i allowed 
objective function 
weight for munitions 
use 
proportion of sorties 
by aircraft i flying 
profile p with weapon 
j not aborted inflight 
number of days in the 
time period 
objective function 
penalty for not 
meeting the time- 
scripted goal for target 
class c 
proportion of aircrews 
manning aircraft i 
qualified to drop 
weapons in 
qualification class q 
objective function 
weight for sorties 
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sorties per day for 
aircraft i 
number of aircraft i 
scheduled to arrive 
total number of type k 
targets in distance 
band d 
total number of type k 
targets 
expected number of 
sorties per aircraft for 
combination i, j, k, p 
considering attrition 
resources consumed 
per weapon j bought 
in budget b 
maximum number of 
weapon j available in 
budget b 
FORMULATION: VARIABLES 







time-scripted goal objective 
value 
sorties assigned 
proportion of kills below goal 
c for target k 
weapons of type j bought in 
budget b 
aircraft of type i bought in 
budget b 




Our experience has shown these LPs often 
have multiple optimal solutions, so we use 
small weights on attrition, sorties, munitions 
expenditures, and weapons and aircraft pur- 
chases to break these ties. These penalty terms 
are defined below: 
at = ATTRWGT* £ ATTRljkp*x 'jk    •*■ ijklp 
ijklp 
so = SORTWGT*^ x ijklp 
mu = MUNWGT* 2 LOAD,*[ATTR, ijkp 
ijklp 
*(1 - NABORTIjp) + NABORTijp]*x, ij j    ijklp 
bu = ^ BUYWGTM 2 ACCOSTS lb*acbtlb 
+ 2 WPNCOSTSjb*wpnbtjb 
i 
Note that these weights can be positive or 
negative; for example, a user may want to give 
a negative weight to SORTWT to influence the 
model to fly as many sorties as possible. 
The following is the objective function for 
time-scripted goals for a single period. This 
minimizes the weighted sum of the proportions 
of each goal not achieved plus the sum of the 
tie-breaking weights: 
min z =      X     (PPENc*pdiffkc) + at + so 
(k,c)Ecc(k,c) 
+ mu + bu 
FORMULATION: SIMPLE BOUNDS 
AND CONSTRAINTS 
All CFAM variables are nonnegative, and 
all have simple upper bounds: 




wpnbtjb < WPNMAXBUYjb 
acbt,b<ACMAXBUYib 
onhanduse j < INVENT j 
The following are the explicit constraints 
available in the model that are used with this 
particular objective function. The swing aircraft 
constraints are omitted because this example 




ijklp pdiffkc 1.0 
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for all (k, c) e cc(k, c). 
Note that a target appearing in multi- 
ple target classes will have multiple positive 
(pdiffkc) differences. This is intentional, as a 
target affecting multiple goals should accumu- 
late multiple penalties in the objective function. 








for all i 
TSORT is a constant computed for each 
sortie combination that determines the ex- 
pected number of sorties that could be flown 
against a target by an aircraft over a fixed num- 
ber of days with a fixed attrition rate. CFAM 
allows the user to choose whether attrition af- 
fects sortie generation or not; in the latter case, 
the user assumes all losses are replaced within 
the time period, and the remaining aircraft can 
fly more sorties to account for the missing air- 
craft prior to its arrival. 
Aircraft attrition constraints: 
2 ATTRljkp*xljklp < MAXLOSS, 
jkip 
Weapons use and weapons family 
constraints: 
2 LOAD,*[ATTRllkp*{l - NABORTi]P) 
iklp 
+ NABORTijp]*x,jklp < onhandusej 
+ X wpnbtjb + CUMARRIVEj 
b 
for all j 
X    onhandusej < FAMLIMf 
imi.f) 
for all f 
The first constraint counts the number of 
sorties that either drop bombs on a target or 
suffer attrition during an in-flight weather 
abort; in both cases, the weapons are con- 
sumed. The second constraint addresses weap- 
ons that share common components, which is 
an important issue in munitions allocation. 
FAMILYLIMf gives the total number of avail- 
able components, but this limit only applies to 
on-hand inventory. CFAM assumes purchased 
or arriving weapons are complete rounds. 
Budget constraints: 
2 ACCOST Sib*acbtib 
+ 2 WPNCOSTSjb*wpnbtjb < BDGLIMITb 
for all b 
Since this example formulation only con- 
tains one time period and theater, it is not pos- 
sible to show the difference between carry and 
no-carry constraints. In the full CFAM models, 
the budget constraints have different forms for 
the different types. 
Kills by distance constraints: 
2        (BDAREGk*EKSijklp 
(i,j,l)&(i,j,l,d),p 
*NABORTijp*xijklp) < X TOTTGTS kd' 
d'sd 
for all k, d 
These constraints limit aircraft-weapon- 
loadout combinations to targets in valid dis- 
tance bands. They are cumulative to allow 
longer-range deliveries to kill close-in targets. 
As a result, the x variables do not need an 
explicit index for distance, eliminating a large 






for all i, w 
These constraints force the model to sched- 
ule sorties in proportion to the average weather 
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forecast. To maintain feasibility, CFAM re- 
quires a dummy target and a dummy weapon 
that each aircraft can employ in each weather 
state. Otherwise, CFAM would force sorties to 
be scheduled for aircraft with no valid sortie 
combinations in particular weather states, mak- 
ing the model infeasible. 
Weapons qualification constraints: 
2      Xijkip =£ PROPORTIONi,* E xijklp 
(j£qc(j,q),klp jklp 
for all (i,q) with PROPORTION^ > 0 
These constraints model situations where 
only a certain proportion of an aircraft's 
aircrews are qualified to employ a weapon, or 
only a certain proportion of an aircraft type are 
equipped to drop a weapon. 
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